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BOOK REVIEWS

Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation, by William J. Abraham. William
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006. xiv + 198 pp. $20.00 (paper).
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, Yale University and University of Virginia
My good friend “Billy” Abraham introduces this recent book of his by
observing that most of those who have written about the epistemology
of religious belief in recent years have had some sort of generic theism in
mind, and were inquiring into the epistemic status of commitment to such
theism. (He acknowledges that Alvin Plantinga’s discussion in Warranted
Christian Belief is an exception to this generalization.) His own project is
instead to inquire into the epistemic status of commitment to what he calls
“canonical theism.” By this he means “that rich vision of God, creation,
and redemption developed over time in the scriptures, articulated in the
Nicene Creed, celebrated in the liturgy of the church, enacted in the lives
of the saints, handed over and received in the sacraments, depicted in iconography, articulated by canonical teachers, mulled over in the Fathers,
and treasured, preserved, and guarded by the episcopate” (p. 43). To this
he adds the explanatory qualification that it is “the theism officially developed in the church prior to the great schism” (p. 14; italics mine).
Abraham observes that the “standard procedure” for developing an
account of the epistemic status of commitment to generic theism has been
first to work out a general account of rationality, justification, knowledge, warrant, or whatever, and then to apply this general account to the
specific case of commitment to generic theism (p. 8). In this procedure,
most of the work goes into developing the general account; the application to generic theism passes by swiftly. Abraham proposes reversing
the order. Start with a person’s commitment to canonical theism, and
then articulate an epistemology for such commitment that satisfies the
“principle of appropriate epistemic fit” (p. 11). Abraham’s central claim,
the claim around which the entire book is organized, is that when we follow this procedure, we will find that we must give central place to divine
revelation. “An appeal to divine revelation [is] central to the warrants for
canonical theism” (p. 79); “divine revelation is a critical component of
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any adequate epistemology relevant to the truth or falsehood of canonical theism” (p. 43).
Abraham is aware of the fact that there is a long tradition of giving
central position to divine revelation in the epistemology of Christian belief (p. 5). In that respect, he sees himself as engaged in a retrieval project;
Plantinga is typical of recent writers in that revelation plays no structural
role in his epistemology of religious belief (p. 97). As we shall see, however, Abraham strongly disagrees with the tradition on just how the idea
of divine revelation is to be employed.
In the course of his discussion, Abraham has fine things to say on a
number of particular topics; his discussion of conversion, for example, is
superb. But I find his overall argument baffling. Let me explain why.
One understanding of divine revelation in the Christian tradition is
that revelation occurs when a person comes to believe something by a
special act of God rather than by the employment of his or her innate
faculties; this is how such different thinkers as Thomas Aquinas and John
Locke understood revelation. On this understanding, the traditional distinction between general and special revelation makes no sense; all revelation is special. Anybody who employs that distinction, as does Abraham,
is working with a different concept.
Revelation, for Abraham, is manifesting what was previously hidden,
disclosing it (p. 84). Divine revelation “can be general, that is, in creation
and conscience; it can be special, that is, in the history of Israel; and it can
be extraspecial, that is, in Jesus Christ.” The content of divine revelation
can be “the hidden depths of the human condition,” or it can be “the nature and purposes of God” (p. 84). Abraham focuses entirely on the latter.
The idea is not that, in addition to God’s other actions, God also performs
the action of revealing himself. Rather, in and through God’s other actions,
God reveals himself. It is in and through the actions of salvation, healing,
and restoration “that God is truly revealed and made known. To develop a
vision of revelation independently of them is profoundly misleading and
distorting” (p. 65). Not all of God’s acts are equally revelatory, however.
God’s acts of speaking are especially revelatory (p. 60).
Let it be noted that this idea of divine revelation plays an altogether
minor role in canonical theism. Abraham appears to regard the Nicene
Creed as stating the heart of canonical theism. The Creed says nothing
about revelation. In canonical theism, says Abraham, “God is primarily
identified as the creator and redeemer of the world” (p. 79). Exactly so;
God is identified as creator and redeemer, not as one who reveals things
about himself. In Christian scripture we do, now and then, find the idea of
God making known something about himself that was previously hidden;
but the idea, though present, is far from dominant.
The Creed does say that the Holy Spirit “spake by the prophets”; and
some will take this to be a passing reference to revelation. Perhaps Abraham takes it that way; it’s not clear to me whether he does or doesn’t. In
my Divine Discourse I argued that speaking is neither to be identified with
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revealing nor understood as a special case of revealing. I don’t know what
Abraham thinks of my argument; he nowhere mentions Divine Discourse.
He says that “claims to divine revelation . . . show up informally in the
canonical heritage of the church” (p. 77) and that “the canonical heritage
informally claims that God has revealed himself uniquely in Christ” (p.
63). I take the word “informally” to be an indication of the fact that Abraham recognizes that the doctrine of divine revelation is, at most, a minor
part of canonical theism.
Abraham’s claim, then, is not that the doctrine of divine revelation has
a significant place in the content of canonical theism; his claim is rather
that this doctrine is indispensable for articulating the epistemic status of
commitment to canonical theism. He calls revelation an “epistemological
concept” (p. 85). And he says that “at the core of the faith, as seen from an
epistemic point of view, there is a special divine revelation that comes to
us from without and brings the truth about God and ourselves to a burning focus” (p. 56). So let us now turn to Abraham’s epistemology.
Abraham prepares for his account of the epistemic status of commitment to canonical theism by positing a sizeable number of what he calls
“epistemic platitudes,” eleven, to be exact. So as to give the reader a sense
of what these come to, let me quote two of them. “We can and should accept the general reliability of our senses, together with the belief-forming
mechanisms and practices that accompany them” (p. 36). And “we can
and should accept testimony. We rightly accept what others tell us without having first established that they are worthy of trust” (p. 37). Abraham’s strategy is to “move from the epistemic platitudes to theism” (p.
39); he will appeal to these platitudes in articulating the epistemic status
of commitment to canonical theism.
About this introduction to the topic, let me say just two things. Though
I myself accept all of the so-called platitudes, these eleven theses by no
means function as platitudes in the field of epistemology. On the contrary,
they are highly controversial epistemological positions. And the fact that
Abraham will help himself to these general epistemological theses in the
course of articulating an epistemology that fits canonical theism makes his
procedure suspiciously like the standard procedure that he criticized.
For the purpose of developing his epistemology, Abraham invites us
to think of canonical theism as having two levels. The first, or lower, level
consists of claims concerning God’s actions of creation and redemption,
and claims as to what God reveals about himself by so acting. No doubt
acceptance of claims concerning God’s creative activity gets formed in
different people in different ways. The mode of formation that Abraham
highlights is clear from the following:
We simply find ourselves aware of the reality of God in our inner experience
and in our encountering the world. Thus we are aware of God in creation
and in his speaking to us in our conscience. We experience God, as it were,
straight off, as we perceive the world around us. We have a sense, however
vague, of God and his presence in the world and in our lives. We have, in
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the language of Hugh of St. Victor, an oculus contemplationis, a contemplative
or spiritually discerning eye. In this case our ability to perceive God’s active
presence in creation is basic and bedrock. (p. 67)

“We come equipped with an original, native capacity to perceive God’s
general and special revelation in the world” (p. 80).
This is purely descriptive. As to the epistemic appraisal of such beliefs
so formed, Abraham says that the Reformed epistemologists are right to
insist that “we are entitled to believe in the general revelation of God in
creation without first having to hand good arguments for the reality of
God. . . . We do not need first to establish that we have spiritual senses,
check out how reliable they are, and then decide to trust them. As with our
other senses, we work from an initial position of trust” (p. 67).
Abraham’s description of the formation of beliefs about God’s redemptive activity goes along the same lines.
In perceiving this or that prophet as a bearer of a message from God, the
believer is not forming and testing a religious hypothesis. In seeing, say,
Jeremiah or Paul as a recipient of divine revelation, the believer finds herself
drawn to believe that God has called and commissioned Jeremiah and Paul
to be bearers of special revelation. In seeing in Jesus Christ the incarnation of
God, the believer in listening to the gospel about Jesus finds herself drawn to
believe that he is the Son of God. In these instances of special and extraspecial revelation, the believer sees God speaking and acting in very particular
ways. To deploy once more the language of the senses, one senses that God
is here, in Jeremiah or in Jesus, speaking and revealing himself in the world.
(p. 72)

As one would expect, Abraham’s epistemic appraisal of such beliefs
so formed is the same as for beliefs about God’s creative activity: one is
entitled to such beliefs.
As a Reformed epistemologist I am, of course, sympathetic to what
Abraham says here. I think that entitlement to hold the beliefs in question is rather more complicated than Abraham indicates in these passages.
But these complications are epicycles on the basic picture that Abraham
draws here; and in other passages, he indicates that he also thinks the full
picture is more complicated. (In my Belief Practices: Essays in Epistemology
[Cambridge, 2010] I develop a general theory of entitlement.)
What I want to call attention to, however, is the fact that the idea of
divine revelation plays no role whatsoever in Abraham’s epistemology of
a person’s commitment to the lower level of canonical theism. The epistemology is entirely about being entitled to accept the deliverances of one’s
innate faculty for the formation of immediate beliefs about God’s activity.
Abraham uses the distinction between general and special revelation to
identify two types of divine action; but one can use other concepts than
those to identify those same two types, as I did. And he uses the concept
of revelation to say that Jeremiah and Paul were recipients of divine revelation; but that is, of course, a different matter from whether you and I
are entitled to believe that they were recipients of divine revelation. In
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Abraham’s account of such entitlement, the idea of divine revelation plays
no role.
But is it not perhaps an accident of the examples Abraham offers that
divine revelation plays no role in his epistemology here? St. Paul speaks
in Romans 1 about the eternal power and divine nature of God being seen
through the things God has made. This is an example of God revealing
something of himself in his actions. So might Abraham not have offered,
as one of his examples, a person’s coming to believe that the cosmos is a
manifestation of God’s eternal power and divine nature?
He might indeed. But the concept of revelation would in that case have
entered into the content of the belief; and that, once again, is different from
playing a role in determining or assessing the epistemic status of the belief.
May it be that it is when we get to the epistemic status of a person’s acceptance of the second level of canonical theism that we need to employ
the idea of divine revelation? The second level of canonical theism consists
of claims about God that are neither claims about God’s creative and redemptive actions nor claims that can plausibly be viewed as claims about
what God reveals of himself in those actions. The full-blown doctrines
of the Trinity and the Incarnation are Abraham’s examples. He observes
that there is a strand within Protestantism that is extremely reluctant to
concede that these doctrines cannot be arrived at by interpretation of what
Scripture teaches; I agree with Abraham that they were not so arrived at
and cannot be so arrived at. (I should speak up in defense of my own
tradition at this point. Abraham describes the Scots Confession of 1560 as
declaring that all doctrine is to be grounded in scripture; what the Confession in fact says is that no doctrine may be “contrary” to scripture.)
How then did the church arrive at the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation?
If we must work with convenient slogans and summary statements, we
might say that the doctrine of the Trinity arose over time out of the deep interaction of the special revelation of God in Israel, the extraspecial revelation
of God in Jesus Christ, experience of God in the Holy Spirit, and sanctified
creative imagination and reason. It is radically incomplete and inadequate
to trace the kind of revolutionary change in the doctrine of God represented
by the Nicene Creed merely to the divine revelation enshrined in scripture.
We must also take into account the place of religious experience, imagination, and reason. We must also provide ample space for the guidance of the
Holy Spirit in leading the church into the truth about God. . . . We might
capture this move in terms of a vision of divine inspiration working in, with,
and through the life of the church as a whole. (pp. 106–107)

This is a description of the emergence of the doctrines; what is Abraham’s assessment of the epistemic status of accepting them? I find him
less than fully lucid on this point. But I think his thought runs along the
following lines. One of the first-level beliefs that we hold is that “there
really was a unique and special revelation given to the world through
Israel in Jesus of Nazareth.” We then reason that since “the understand-

BOOK REVIEWS

107

ing of this divine revelation is not immediately apparent, . . . it would be
extremely odd for God to go to these lengths to make known his name and
not provide critical assistance to the church as a whole in unpacking what
this means” (p. 106). Having reasoned along those lines, we find ourselves
trusting that the Spirit has inspired the church in arriving at these doctrines. If we wish, we can support that trust by rehearsing what it was that
led the church to arrive at these doctrines in the first place.
Much could be said about all this. But on this occasion, the point I want
to make is that, also at this second level, the idea of divine revelation plays
no role in Abraham’s epistemic assessment of a person’s commitment to
canonical theism. The epistemology is entirely about being entitled to
trust, on the basis of an inference from certain immediate beliefs about
God’s activity that one is entitled to hold, that the Spirit led the church to
arrive at the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation.
Let me add that not only does the idea of divine revelation not play
a role in Abraham’s epistemology at this point; to one’s surprise it does
not even play a role in his description of how the doctrines of Trinity and
Incarnation emerged. If the Spirit inspired the church to formulate and
adopt these doctrines, is that inspiration not a revelatory activity of God?
And if it is, then presumably the epistemology that Abraham employed
for the first level is applicable for this level as well.
Abraham rejects the hyper-Protestant practice of identifying divine
revelation with scripture and of holding that a doctrine is acceptable only
if it can be arrived at by biblical interpretation. He proposes that instead
of thinking of revelation as having this grounding function for doctrine
we think of the acceptance of revelation as “perspective constituting” (p.
114) or “world-constituting” (p. 143). What he means is that, once one
comes to believe that God has acted creatively and redemptively, then lots
of things look different, including one’s epistemological situation; for example, accepting the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation no longer looks
like a bizarre sacrificium intellectus. Accepting divine revelation, he says, is
like crossing a threshold. And surely he is right about that. But what leads
to the reorientation is not just beliefs about what God reveals of himself in
his actions; what leads to the reorientation is beliefs about God’s actions
in general—not just the belief that God’s eternal power and divine nature
are manifested in creation, but the belief that the cosmos as a whole, and
human beings within it, have been created by God.
The source of my bafflement will now be clear. Abraham says that what
he has done is “drop the idea of divine revelation into the debate.” He
has indeed done this. But I fail to see that the idea does any epistemological work for him. Worse, it sometimes leads him into distorting canonical
theism—as it has led many of his and my predecessors into distortion.
In canonical theism, and in the scriptures out of which canonical theism
emerged, there is a delicate balance of focus between, on the one hand,
God’s actions of creation, providence, redemption, and consummation,
and, on the other hand, what these actions reveal about God. In those who
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give a dominant role to the doctrine of divine revelation, there is a discernible tendency for this balanced focus to be upset. The theologian’s focus is
displaced, for example, from the fact that God was in Christ reconciling the
world to himself, to what this action reveals about God. Abraham speaks of
“the gracious unveiling of God in the covenant acts and deliverance of Israel from Egypt” (p. 96). To the best of my knowledge, no biblical writer locates God’s grace in the unveiling that occurs in God’s deliverance of Israel
from Egypt; they all locate it in God’s deliverance of Israel from Egypt.
In our relationship to our fellow human beings, such displacement of
focus would often be insulting. I insult you if, instead of responding to
your request for aid, I focus my attention on what your making of this
request reveals about you. Are things different in our relationship to God?

The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism, by Lynne
Rudder Baker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. xv + 253 pp.
WILLIAM HASKER, Huntington College
Practical realism, the name given to her position by Lynne Rudder Baker,
is analytic metaphysics with a difference. The difference is stated emphatically by Baker in her concluding summary:
It is time to get on the table an alternative to the dominant metaphysical
theories that accord no ontological significance to things that everyone cares
about—not only concrete objects like one’s car keys, or the Mona Lisa, but
also commonplace states of affairs like being employed next year, or having
enough money for retirement. I believe that such ordinary phenomena are
the stuff of reality, and I have tried to offer a metaphysics that has room in its
ontology for the ordinary things that people value. (p. 240)

Baker’s first chapter is entitled “Beginning in the middle,” a phrase
which carries three distinct though related meanings. We begin with our
actual language, with its embedded picture of the world. We also begin
in the middle epistemologically, aware of our presuppositions but not attempting to eliminate them as Descartes did. And we begin with the medium-sized objects—people, nonhuman organisms, natural objects, artifacts,
and artworks—that are of primary concern to us in our lives. Of particular
importance are “ID phenomena”—objects, properties, and events that are
“intention-dependent,” in that their existence depends on the existence of
persons with propositional attitudes. Unlike a number of other metaphysical views, Baker’s approach takes ID phenomena with utmost seriousness
and refuses to relegate them to second-class ontological status.
The agenda thus established is pursued in part I, “Everyday Things.”
Chapter 2 argues for the reality and non-reducibility of ordinary things,
a theme which continues in chapter 3 on artifacts, to which Baker (unlike
many others from Aristotle on down) accords full ontological status. Any

